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Two important stylized facts about human choice behavior are that this
behavior is probabilistic and is aﬀected by social interaction. Probabilistic
choice models are routinely used to explain behavior in psychological ex-
periments, see, for example, Bush and Mosteller (1955). In economics the
probabilistic choice models were introduced by Luce (1959).
In this paper I consider the general form of a probabilistic adaptive behav-
ior, based on social information. First, I consider a broad class of stochastic
behavioral rules. I prove that any stochastic behavioral rule in a social en-
vironment is decomposable into four components: deterministic adjustment,
exogenous experimentation, imitation, and experimentation based on social
information, which I call imitation of scope. Then I de￿ne a class of stochas-
tic behavioral rules called local improvement rules. I prove that for these
rules the deterministic part induces a generalized gradient dynamics, that
is an individual adjusts her behavior in the direction of an increase of some
function.
12 A MODEL OF SOCIAL ADAPTATION
Suppose an individual has to make repeated choices over time from a
set of alternatives Ω ⊂ Rn, which is assumed to be compact, and Σ is a
sigma-algebra on Ω.A t t i m e t the individual observes the current choice of
a randomly selected member of a population, y(t).O b s e r v a t i o n sa td i ﬀerent
moments of time are assumed to be independent. For any Γ ∈ Σ,d e ￿ne
P({x(t)},{y(t)},Γ,t,τ) to be the transition probability, that is the proba-
bility that the individual who at time t has a history of choices {x(t)} and a
history of observations {y(t)}, will make a choice w ∈ Γ at time t + τ.
Axiom 1 P({x(t)},{y(t)},Γ,t,τ)=P(x,y,Γ,t,τ), where x = x(t), and
y = y (t).
Axiom 1 says that the transition probabilities are only determined by the
current choice and the current observation. In other words, if the observa-
tion made at time t is randomly selected from a distribution with a density





2will be a Markov process. Axiom 1 is rather weak. Indeed, assume the agent
keeps track about her choices and observations at discrete moments of time,
and remembers only ￿nitely many choices and observations. Then one can
always rede￿ne the choice space in such a way that Axiom 1 will hold. Hence,
Axiom 1 is essentially a ￿nite memory assumption.
Axiom 2 There exists a function p(x,y,z,t,τ) > 0 measurable in z and
twice continuously diﬀerentiable in τ such that for any Γ ∈ Σ the transition







Vδ(x)={w ∈ Ω : kw − xk < δ},
where k•k denotes the Euclidean norm. Here, and throughout this paper, Xc
denotes the complement of the set X.
Axiom 3 For any δ > 0 and any x ∈ Ω, the transition probability satis￿es
3P(x,y,V c










Va r(x(t + τ) − x(t)| x(t),y (t)).
Moreover, for any x ∈ Ω and any neighborhood V (x) the transition prob-
ability P(x,y,V c(x),t,τ) considered as a function of y attains a minimum
at y = x.
Axiom 2 says that the position at time t + τ, conditional on the position x
at time t and observation y at time t, has a strictly positive density function.
To understand the meaning of this assumption, let us introduce the following
concept.
De￿nition 1 Let λ denote Lebesque measure. A distribution F is called
singular if there exists a Borel set B0 such that:
1. λ(B0)=0 ;
2. F(B0)=1;
3. F({x})=0for every x ∈ Ω.
If a distribution is not singular it is called regular. Axiom 2 ensures that the
distribution will remain regular at all times if it is at time t =0 .T h ef a c t
4that the density is strictly positive ensures existence of steady states of the
corresponding Markov process in the case when the transition probability
does not depend on t.T h e￿r s tp a r to fA x i o m3s a y st h a tf o ra n yr e a l i z a t i o n
of observations y(t) the stochastic process for x(t) is Khinchine continuous
and is uniquely de￿ned by its generator (Kanan (1979)). For example, it
will be satis￿ed if conditional on the realization of y(t) the process x(t) is a
Wiener process with drift. The second part is assumed for representational
convenience.
Finally, I will assume:
Axiom 4 p(x,y,z,t) is four times continuously diﬀerentiable in x and y
for any t ≥ 0 and any realization of z.
Under Axioms 1-4 it is possible to derive an expression for the generator
of the Markov process with transition probability (1).
Theorem 1 Assume Axioms 1-4 are satis￿ed. Then there exists a twice
continuously diﬀerentiable vector function ￿1(x,t),a n dm a t r i x - v a l u e df u n c -
tions ￿2(x,y,t), Γ1(x,t),a n dΓ2(x,y,t), such that the matrices Γ1(x,t),a n d
Γ2(x,y,t) are positive semide￿nite and the generator of the Markov process

























and Tr denotes the trace of a matrix.
Proof. By de￿nition (Rogers and Williams (1994)) the generator of the






where I is the identity operator. It can be shown (Kanan (1979)) that under
the assumptions of the theorem












Va r(x(t + τ) − x(t)).
























Using Axiom 4 one can write (omitting dependence on time to simplify no-
tation):
￿(x,y)=￿(x,x)+￿


























Positive semide￿nitness of matrices Γ1 and Γ2 follows from their de￿nition














and the theorem is proven.
Theorem 1 allows us to derive an equation for the individual￿s choice
density function. Denote this density by f(x,t), then the function f(•,t)
will satisfy the Kolmogorov forward equation for the stochastic process with
8transition probabilities (1). To write this equation we need the following
de￿nition:
De￿nition 2 Operator $∗ is called an adjoint operator for the operator $
if
1. dom$ = dom$∗ ⊂ C(Ω)






Here dom$ is the domain of the operator $ and C(Ω) denotes the set of the
continuous functions from Ω to R. If the generator of a stochastic process





where $∗ is an adjoint operator for $. Hence, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 2 Let the distribution of choices in the population be described by
a continuous density function f(x,0) at time t =0 .U n d e r A x i o m s1-4, the













h∇Tr(Γ(x,t)f),n(x)i =0 on ∂Ω, (15)
where div denotes divergence of the vector ￿eld and, n(x) is a unit vector









TΓ2(x,y,t)(y − x)fY(y,t)dy (17)
Proof. The boundary condition ensures the conservation of the probability
and follows from Axiom 2. Axiom 2 precludes the possibility of having a
positive probability mass concentrated on the boundary and forces the ￿ow
of the probability to be zero at each point on the boundary. Take dom$ to be
the set of all twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions on Ω satisfying the
10boundary conditions. Then it is straightforward to check (using integration
by parts) that the operator $∗ de￿ned by:
$





is an adjoint operator for the operator $.




For any twice continuously diﬀerentiable function f there exists a unique f
satisfying (14)-(17) and a given initial condition (Ito (1992)).
It is worth noting that writing the Kolmogorov forward equation in the
form (13) rather then (14) allows us to use it for description of cases where the
population choices do not have densities (for example, are discrete). In this
case f should be interpreted as a generalized function (distribution).1 Let =
denote the space of in￿nitely diﬀerentiable functions with compact support.
A generalized function is a continuous linear functional on =.L e t K be a
linear diﬀerential operator de￿ned on functions from =,a n dK∗ be its adjoint
1Although the term distribution is common in the literature I will use the term ￿gen-
eralized function￿ to prevent confusion with probability distribution.






3 BEHAVIORAL INTERPRETATION OF A
SOCIAL ADAPTATION RULE
To interpret Theorem 2, let us consider a speci￿c behavioral model. The
framework is similar to the general model except that time is assumed to be
discrete, thus t ∈ {0,τ, 2τ, 3τ, ...}, and the behavioral rule is given explicitly
by a stochastic diﬀerence equation:
xt+τ − xt = κ(xt,y t,t)τ + B(τ,x t,y t,t)(yt − xt)εt + Λ(xt,t)ξt. (18)
12Here κ(xt,y t,t)=λ(xt,t)+δ(xt,y t,t),w h e r eδ(xt,y t)=ν(xt,y t,t)(yt−xt) for
some matrix ν. All functions are assumed to be twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable in xand y, and continuously diﬀerentiable in t. The random variables
εt and ξt are assumed to be independently, identically distributed for each
t, independent across time, have a compact support, E(ε)=E(ξ)=0 ,a n d
Va r(ε)=1, Va r(ξ)=I.
In (18) the ￿rst term on the right hand side describes the deterministic
adaptation, the second the direct imitation of choices, the third experimen-
tation based on social information, which I will identify as ￿imitation of
scope,￿ and the fourth exogenous experimentation. Direct imitation means
that the agent simply moves towards the observed choice. This interpretation
suggests that νkk ≥ 0 though it is not important for the formal derivation
of the model. Imitation of scope means that the individual opens a search
window the width of which is determined by the degree of disagreement be-
tween her current choice and the observed choice of a randomly selected
agent from the population with density fY(y,t),t h a ti sb y(yt − xt).T h e
value of such behavior can be intuitively explained: since the observation
the agent makes is the choice of another boundedly rational agent, there is
no good reason to imitate the observed choice directly. On the other hand,
13the spread of the choices in the population indicates that society as a whole
does not know the optimal choice and, hence, that there may be returns to





ﬂ ﬂ increases probabilistically in the population spread for
each k. Nondiagonal coeﬃcients of matrices ν and B can be interpreted as
similarity coeﬃcients. They measure how much the choice of xk is similar to
the choice of x‘. Further discussion of the social imitation rules will be given
in Section 4.
I will study the continuous time limit of the stochastic process generated
by (18). To pass to this limit I assume:
Condition 1 There exists a twice continuously diﬀerentiable matrix valued
function b : R2n → Rn2, such that B(τ,x t,y t,t)=b(xt,y t)
√
τ.
Let f(x,t) denote the density of the individual￿s choices at time t.I f
K ⊂ Ω is a Borel set, denote by G(∆t,x,K) the probability of getting to the
set K from point x during the time interval ∆t under the dynamics (18).
For any η > 0 let Uη(x) denote an η−neighborhood of the point x.T h e
following result is well known in the theory of stochastic processes:
Theorem 3 Suppose there are functions ζ(x) and Ξ(x,t) twice continuously
diﬀerentiable on the interior of Ω and continuously diﬀerentiable on Ω such





Uη(wt − xt)G(∆t,xt,dw t)=ζ(x)∆t + o(∆t)
3.
R
Uη(wt − xt)(wt − xt)TG(∆t,xt,dw t)=Ξ(x,t)∆t + o(∆t).









For a proof see Kanan (1979). Applying theorem 3 to the behavioral rule
(18) one obtains the following theorem:
Theorem 4 Assume that the adaptation process satis￿es Condition 1;t h e n












ν(x,y)(y − x)fY(y,t)dy (21)








Proof. The proof of this theorem consists of checking all three hypothesis
of Theorem 3, which can be done directly from the adaptation formula (18).
Comparing (13)-(16) with (19)-(21) one can arrive at the following result.
Theorem 5 Any social adaptation rule can be decomposed into deterministic
adaptation, direct imitation, experimentation and imitation of scope.
4 AN ENDOGENOUS MODEL OF SOCIAL
ADAPTATION
In this section I assume that there exists a population of individuals that
follow the adaptation process described in Sections 1 and 2. I will assume
that the individuals make their observations and adjustments independently.
Under these assumptions I will be able to give a population interpretation
of the function f(x,t). Then I will show that it is possible to assume that
the observations are drawn from the same population that is engaged in
16adaptation. This will complete my model of social adaptation.
Assume that there is a population of individuals engaged in the adap-
tation process described in Sections 1 and 2, and for any ￿nite set of these
individuals their observations and adaptations are independent. Let I de-
note the population. Suppose A ∈ Σ, and consider a sigma-algebra S on ΩI
generated by the sets:
{xi|xi ∈ A} = A
i.
Let ￿ be ameasure onS consistent with the ￿nite dimensional distributions of
the individuals￿ choices. Select N individuals from the population at random





1 if xi(t) ∈ A,
0 if xi(t) / ∈ A.











Then there exists an extension ￿ of measure ￿ such that B is ￿ -m e a s u r a b l e
and ￿(B)=0 . (See Judd 1985 for a detailed discussion). This result allows
17us to interpret f(x,t) as the population density of choices. To be able to
interpret the model with a continuum of agents as the limit of the models
with ￿nitely many agents some additional work has to be done. For example,
one can use hyper￿nite discrete models from the nonstandard analysis. These
models have the advantage of simultaneously approximating the function
theory in the Euclidean space and the probability theory of large discrete
models. This argument is developed in Keisler (1984).
Now I want to allow the individuals to make observations from their own




with the initial condition fY(x,0) = f(x,0). I prove the existence of a
solution to this problem in the Appendix. Since system (14)-(17) has a
unique solution for any fY(x,t), any such choice of fY(x,t) implies that
f(x,t)=fY(x,t) at all t ≥ 0. This implies that the two populations can be
identi￿ed. Hence, I will assume below that there is one population with a




18This equation is nonlinear. Hence, it is interesting to investigate the
uniqueness of a steady state for the population density. The following result
holds.
Theorem 6 Suppose the coeﬃcients of a social adaptation rule do not de-
pend on time. Then a steady state of Markov process (2.18) exists. If ∃ δ > 0
such that cTΓ(x)c ≥ δkck
2 for ∀x ∈ Ω, then the steady state is unique.
Proof. Existence follows from Theorem 5 and Axiom 2. If ∃ δ > 0 such
that cTΓ(x)c ≥ δ kck
2 for ∀x ∈ Ω then it is easy to check that the Markov
chain (1) is irreducable; hence the steady state is unique.
Uniqueness will not generally hold in the absence of exogenous noise. It is
easy to see that in this case any distribution concentrated at a point x∗ such
that ￿1(x∗)=0is a steady state. Since there might be several such points, a
steady state need not be unique. If ￿2(x)=0then a probability distribution
that assigns arbitrary weights to diﬀerent critical points of ￿1(•) is a steady
state. However, it will not be a steady state if ￿2(•) is not zero. Steady
states characterized with continuous densities are also possible. Consider the
following example.
Example. Let ￿1(x)=￿2(x)=Γ1(x)=0and Γ2(x)=1.L e tt h ea d m i s s i -
ble set be Ω =[ −a,a]. It is easy to see that the distribution concentrated
19at any point is a steady state. It is easy to show that f(x) is a density
































20Then f(x) is a steady state density function.
Even though Axioms 1-4 put no restrictions on the coeﬃcients in (18), the
intuitive interpretation of this rule allows us to lay down some restrictions.
For example, interpretation of ￿2 as direct imitation allows us to impose
restrictions ￿2kk ≥ 0, ￿2k‘ =0for k 6= ‘. Such restrictions may prove very
useful if one attempts to estimate equation (18). In the next subsection I
will argue that an interpretation of (18) as a form of learning allows to put
rather strong restrictions on its deterministic part, ￿1.
5 THE DETERMINISTIC COMPONENT OF
A SOCIAL ADAPTATION RULE.
5.1 LOCALLY IMPROVING ADAPTATION RULES
In the previous section I showed that any social adaptation rule can be
decomposed into deterministic adaptation, exogenous experimentation, di-
rect imitation, and imitation of scope. However, no restrictions apart from
some regularity conditions were obtained for the coeﬃcients of the process.
In this section, I will de￿ne a class of stochastic adaptation rules called lo-
21cally improving adaptation rules and get for them some restrictions on the
deterministic part of the stochastic process. To do this I will introduce the
notion of a deterministic agent. The deterministic agent adjusts her choices
based only on her current position and does not engage in any kind of exper-
imentation. Intuitively, a rule is locally improving if a deterministic agent
does not have cycles in her choices.
One natural deterministic learning rule is the gradient dynamics, where
the time derivative of choices equals the gradient of some scalar function
which can be naturally interpreted as a utility function. Intuitively, it means
that individuals adjust their choices in the direction of the fastest increase
of utility. The gradient dynamics was thoroughly studied by Arrow and
Hurwicz (1960). Below I will show that a slight generalization of the gradient
dynamics covers all reasonable continuous deterministic learning rules.
In this subsection I will restrict myself to time homogenous stochastic
adaptation rules, that is I will assume that ￿1 and Γ1 do not depend on time,
while ￿2 and Γ2 m a yd e p e n do nt i m eo n l yt h r o u g hf(y,t).Iw i l ls h o wt h a t
under some regularity conditions a time homogenous stochastic behavioral
rule is locally improving if and only if its deterministic part, ￿1(x), determines
a generalized gradient dynamics, that is, it always points in the direction of
22an increase of some real-valued function. This function is a natural candidate
for a utility function of the individual. To proceed further I will need some
de￿nitions.
De￿nition 3 A population is called deterministic if ￿2(x,y)=Γ1(x)=
Γ2(x,y)=Γ3(x)=0 .
Theorem 5 and equation (18) imply that the choices of an individual of such




The evolution of the density of choices in a deterministic population is gov-
erned by the continuity equation:
∂f
∂t
+ div(f￿1)=0 . (24)
The term ￿continuity equation￿ comes from ￿uids mechanics. If one assumes
that f(x,t) i sad e n s i t yo fam o v i n g￿uid at point x at time t and ￿1 is its
velocity, then equation (24) simply says that the ￿ow of ￿uid is continuous.
De￿nition 4 I will say that the choice x1 is revealed-strictly-preferred by
a deterministic agent to the choice x2 (x1 6= x2),d e n o t e dx1Rx2,i ft h e r e
23exist t1 >t 2 ≥ 0, such that x(t) is a solution of (23) with x(t1)=x1 and
x(t2)=x2.
This de￿nition says that, assuming the deterministic agent follows a local
improvement rule, choices which are made later can be interpreted as better
choices for a deterministic agent2. However, to interpret later choices as
better choices R should be rationalizable by a preference relation. A suf-
￿cient condition for this is that R satis￿es the Strong Axiom of Revealed
Preferences (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)). To determine the
conditions under which this preference relation is representable by a contin-
uously diﬀerentiable utility function, we need the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 5 A social behavioral rule with the deterministic part ￿1(x) is
called a locally improving rule if there exists a continuously diﬀerentiable
function U(x) such that
1. ∇U(x)=0if and only if ￿1(x)=0 ;
2. x1Rx2 implies U(x1) >U(x2).
Finally, I will de￿ne a generalized gradient dynamics.
2This need not be the case when an agent uses a stochastic algorithm since she might
experiment with choices.
24De￿nition 6 Av e c t o r￿eld ￿1(x) is said to induce a generalized gradient
dynamics if there exists a continuously diﬀerentiable function Π(x) such that:
1. ￿1(x)=0if and only if ∇Π(x)=0 ;
2. h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i ≥ 0 for any x ∈ Ω and h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i =0implies
￿1(x)=0 .
Here and throughout the dissertation h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i denotes the inner prod-
uct of two vectors. This de￿nition implies that the function Π(x) increases
across the solutions of system (23), and stable steady states of the system
(23) correspond to regular local maxima of the function Π(•).
I will make the following regularity assumption.
Condition 2 The Jacobian matrix D￿1/Dx has full rank at every point of
Ω.
Now I am ready to state the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Assume Axioms 1-4 and Condition 2 are satis￿ed. A social
adaptation rule is a locally improving rule if and only if its deterministic
part ￿1(x) induces a generalized gradient dynamics.
Proof. Under Axioms 1-4, Theorem 1 implies that the deterministic part
of a social adaptation rule is well de￿ned. Suppose the vector ￿1(x) in-
25duces a generalized gradient dynamics, then there exists a continuously dif-
ferentiable function Π(x) such that h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i ≥ 0 for any x ∈ Ω and
h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i =0implies ￿1(x)=0 .L e t x1Rx2. Then there exists a





Since x2 6= x1 implies that x2 is not a steady state of (23) ￿1(x2) 6=0 .
Hence, De￿nition 5 implies that h￿1(x2),∇Π(x2)i > 0.B y c o n t i n u i t y ,
h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i > 0 in some neighborhood of point x2, and is nonnegative
everywhere, hence Π(x1) > Π(x2).S i n c eΠ(x) is continuously diﬀerentiable,
take U(x)=Π(x).T h e n D e ￿nition 4 will be satis￿ed, hence the social
adaptation rule is a locally improving rule.
Now suppose that a social adaptation rule is a locally improving rule.
Then there exists a continuously diﬀerentiable function U(x) such that
1. ∇U(x)=0if and only if ￿1(x)=0 ;
2. x1Rx2 implies U(x1) >U(x2).
De￿ne Π(x)=U(x). Then the function Π(x) is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable and satis￿es the ￿rst part of the De￿nition 5. To check the second part
of De￿nition 5, ￿rst, assume that there exists x2 such that h￿1(x2),∇Π(x2)i
26< 0. Then there exists a neighborhood V (x2) of x2 such that h￿1(w),∇Π(w)i
< 0 for any w ∈ V (x2).L e t t2 =0 , t1 > 0 and denote x1 = x(t1),w h e r e
x(t) is the solution of system (24) with initial condition x(0) = x2.F o r a
suﬃciently small t1 the inclusion x1 ∈ V (x2) will be satis￿ed. Then x1Rx2
and U(x1) − U(x2)=Π(x1) − Π(x2)=
R t1
t2 h￿1(x(t)),∇Π(x(t)idt < 0,w h i c h
is a contradiction, hence h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i ≥ 0.
Now assume that h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i =0 , but ￿1(x) 6=0 . Then, by construc-
tion, ∇Π(x) 6=0 . Then there exists a neighborhood W(x) of point x such
that ∇Π(w) 6=0for any w ∈ W(x).L e t J(x) denote the Jacoby matrix
D￿1(x)/Dx. Then there exists w∗ ∈ W(w) such that h￿1(w),∇Π(w)i =
(w −x)TJ(w∗)∇Π(w). Since matrix J is nondegenerate one can always ￿nd
w such that h￿1(w),∇Π(w)i < 0, which was already proven to be impossible.
This completes the proof.
The above theorem restricts the deterministic part of a social adaptation
rule, assuming that in the absence of the stochastic and social components
the adaptation rule corresponds to a gradual increase of some real valued
function which can be interpreted as a utility function. I will summarize the
results obtained so far in a theorem.
Theorem 8 Any time-homogeneous locally improving social adaptation rule
27can be decomposed into the generalized gradient dynamics, exogenous exper-
imentation, direct imitation, and imitation of scope.
The above theorem allows us to parametrize general adaptation rules. Such
a parametrization is useful for estimating these rules. For a discussion of
possible estimation techniques see Basov (2001).
5.2 PREFERENCES
In the preceding subsection I showed that the deterministic part, ￿1(x),o f
any adaptation rule de￿nes a generalized gradient dynamics. In other words,
there exists a continuously diﬀerentiable function Π(•) such that:
1. ￿1(x)=0if and only if ∇Π(x)=0 ;
2. h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i ≥ 0 for any x ∈ Ω and h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i =0implies
￿1(x)=0 .
The function Π(•) can be naturally interpreted as the utility function of
an individual. However, the function Π(•) need not be unique. Diﬀerent
functions satisfying the above conditions need not even be increasing trans-
formations of one another. In this section I will deal with the uniqueness
problem. At a conceptual level, I am asking the question: Given an adapta-
tion rule, what can we conclude about the preferences of an individual? To
28answer this question let us ￿rst consider the case when the vector ￿1(•) can be
represented as the gradient of a scalar function Π(•). In this case, the func-
tion Π(•) is determined uniquely up to an additive constant. If one interprets
the function Π(•) as a utility function of the individual, then the determin-
istic part of the learning rule describes the gradient dynamics; namely, the
individual will adjust her choices in the direction of the fastest increase of
her utility. This makes the interpretation of Π(•) as a utility function nat-
ural. In general, the vector ￿eld ￿1(•) cannot be represented as the gradient
of a scalar function. In this case, I will de￿ne a utility function Π(•) in a
way such that ￿1(•) is a generalized gradient dynamics and the discrepancy
between the gradient of Π(•) and ￿1(•) is minimal. Formally, de￿ne a set







s.t.h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i ≥ 0, Π(x) ≤ M on Ω, ∇Π(x)=0on Ω/Ω1, (27)
where k•k denotes the Euclidean norm and λ i st h eL e b e s q u em e a s u r eo nΩ.
3This number is de￿ned for technical reasons which will become clear later.
29The following theorem holds:
Theorem 9 Assume that ￿1(x) induces a generalized gradient dynamics.
A solution to the problem (26)-(27) exists and is unique up to an additive
constant. Moreover, if Π(•) is a solution to (26)-(27) and at some x0 ∈ Ω
either ∇Π(x0)=0or h￿1(x0),∇Π(x0)i =0 ,t h e n￿1(x0)=0 .
Proof. First, note that Π ∈ C1(Ω) and the fact that Ω is compact implies
that Π ∈ L2(Ω) and ∇Π ∈ L2(Ω).D e ￿ne
H
1(Ω)={φ : φ ∈ L














Let K = {Π ∈ H1(Ω):h￿1(x),∇Π(x)i ≥ 0 on Ω1, Π(x) ≤ M on Ω,
∇Π(x)=0on Ω/Ω1}.
To prove that the functional V (•) achieves a maximum at K it is suﬃcient
30to prove that V (•) is coercive and K is nonempty, closed, and convex (see,
e.g., Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia 1980). It is straightforward to see that
the set K satis￿es the above requirements.
Recall that a functional V (•) is called coercive if V (Π) tends to −∞ when








By Poincare￿s inequality (see, e.g., Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia 1980) there
exists a constant N(Ω) such that for all Π ∈ H1(Ω), |Π − Π|L2 ≤ N(Ω)|∇Π|L2.
Since the function Π is assumed to be bounded from above (Π(x) ≤ M on
Ω), this implies that
|Π|H1 → +∞⇔|∇Π|L2 → +∞ . (32)
Now it is straightforward from (30) that V (Π) tends to −∞ when |Π|H1 tends
to +∞,i .e .V (•) is coercive.
To prove the uniqueness note that the function v : Rn → R de￿ned as
31v(z)=−(￿1(x) − z)
2 (33)
is strictly concave. Hence, for any α ∈ [0,1]
v(αz1 +( 1 − α)z2) ≥ αv(z1)+( 1 − α)v(z2) (34)
with equality only if α ∈ {0,1}. Suppose there are two solutions to the
maximization problem, Π1 and Π2 and V (Π1)=V (Π2)=V ∗.S i n c et h es e t





















Since V ∗ is de￿ned to be the maximum value of the functional V (•) the
inequality (36) is satis￿ed as an equality, which implies ∇Π1 = ∇Π2,a n d ,
hence, the function Π(•) is de￿ned uniquely up to an additive constant.
32Now suppose that either ∇Π(x0)=0or h￿1(x0),∇Π(x0)i =0but
￿1(x0) 6=0 .S i n c e￿1(•) induces a generalized gradient dynamics, there exists
a continuously diﬀerentiable function Π∗ such that h￿1(x0),∇Π∗(x0)i > 0.
Since the set Ω is compact, Π∗ is bounded, and hence one can always assure
that Π∗(x) ≤ M on Ω with an additive constant. Let x0 ∈ W1 ⊂ W2 ⊂ Ω,
where ⊂ denotes strict inclusion and W1 and W2 are open sets. One can
always construct a function Π∗∗ ∈ K which coincides with εΠ∗ on W1 and
with Π outside W2. For an appropriate choice of ε > 0, W1,a n dW2,i t
will decrease the objective functional given by (30), which contradicts the
hypothesis that Π maximizes V .
The theorem states that the utility function is determined up to an ad-
ditive constant. This means that the diﬀerence in utility between any two
choices is well de￿ned. This representation is more precise than in con-
ventional utility maximization theory under certainty, where the utility is
de￿ned up to a continuous increasing transformation; or under uncertainty,
where the utility is de￿n e du pt oap o s i t i v ea ﬃne transformation. In the
last case, one can choose arbitrarily both the origin and the scale. In the
present case one is still free to choose the origin, but the level is ￿xed. This
happens because in my framework the utility function determines not only
33the preference ordering but also the speed of adaptation. Since the speed of
adaptation is observable, the change in the level of utility is observable as
well.
Theorem 8 also states that if the vector ￿eld ￿1(•) is not identically zero,
then the underlying preferences are not trivial, that is there are at least two
choices with diﬀerent levels of utility.
6S O C I A L I M I T A T I O N
Learning, and adaptation in general, is often a social process. Equation
(18) expresses this. It can be considered as a numerical rule for adaptation
that utilizes social information. The agents using this rule can be considered
to be procedurally rational; under some conditions this process may converge
to the rational outcome4. The stochastic component of the rule has the virtue
of reducing the probability of getting stuck at a local maximum. Endogenis-
ing the random component by making it a function of others￿ actions can
facilitate convergence. But this comes at a cost: a population using social
adaptation instead of, say, individual experimentation, may not reach the ra-
4By the rational outcome I mean the choice that maximizes the function Π de￿ned in
the Theorem 8. This function can naturally be interpreted as a utility function of the
individual.
34tional outcome. In contrast, there are individual experimentation algorithms
that guarantee the rational outcome will be reached provided noise is reduced
suﬃciently slowly. An example of such a rule is ￿simulated annealing.￿ For
a discussion of theoretical and computational aspects of simulated anneal-
ing, see Laarhoven (1988). The problem with individual adaptation rules is
that they guarantee convergence to an optimum only if noise is reduced very
slowly, and hence, might perform rather poorly if time is valuable. Social
adaptation speeds up convergence when there is consensus in society about
the optimal choice, due to the fact that information from the entire society
about the payoﬀ structure is used.
In the discussion after equation (18), I identi￿ed two types of social adap-
tation, direct imitation and imitation of scope. The ￿rst is rather easy to
understand: it simply says that the choice of an agent at time t+1 is a convex
combination of her choice and the choice of a randomly selected member of
the population at time t. Now I discuss imitation of scope. Imitation of scope
necessarily arises as a part of the general adaptation rule as long as the rate
of experimentation is aﬀected by the social information. A possible intuition
behind this is that: if the observed choice is close to the observer￿s choice
then there is a good chance they are both close to the optimum. Hence, the
35incentive to experiment with a more distant choice is small. On the other
hand, if the two choices are far apart, then at least one of them is far away
from the optimum. Symmetry implies that the chances are about even that
it is the observer or the observed who is farther from the optimum. In this
case, the incentive to experiment with a choice farther away is higher.
Under imitation of scope, noisy choices may persist in the long-run even if
there is no exogenous experimentation and the objective function is strictly
concave. Intuitively, while the gradient dynamics shrinks the population
variance, each act of experimentation injects a noise into the system, and
leads to an increase in the population variance. Under some conditions these
two eﬀects can exactly balance each other. This may have profound economic
implications. For example, low-powered incentives and compensation for
luck rather than eﬀort can be explained by this behavior. For a detailed
discussion see Basov (2001). It is also important to mention that due to the
social imitation, the equation for the population choice density function is
nonlinear. One of the consequences of this nonlinearity, possibility of multiple
steady states, was discussed earlier in this paper.
366.1 DOES THE OPTIMAL ADAPTATION RULE EX-
IST?
In this subsection, I consider the question of whether there exists an adap-
tation rule which behaves suﬃciently well in all environments. To put the
question more formally: Is there an adaptation rule which, given any payoﬀ
function and any initial distribution, will lead to a rational outcome in the
steady state? A weaker version of this question would be: is there an adap-
tation rule that for any payoﬀ function will result in a stationary distribution
that assigns small probability to being far from the global maximum? If the
answer to at least one of these questions were ￿yes,￿ then one might expect
that such an adaptation rule would have been selected by evolution, since the
individuals who had been genetically programmed or indoctrinated to follow
such a rule would have achieved high payoﬀsi naw i d ev a r i e t yo fe n v i r o n -
ments. This would have allowed us to specify a priori the coeﬃcients of the
adaptation rule and make sharper predictions about the economic outcomes
than is possible for a general adaptation rule.
The answer to the both of these questions is ￿no,￿ however. More pre-
cisely, I am going to prove that, no matter what adaptation rule is used, in
37some environment it will be weakly out-performed by just making random
choices from the set of alternatives.
Theorem 10 Given any stationary adaptation rule speci￿ed by the matrices
Γ1, Γ2,￿ 2 ∈ C2(Ω ￿ Ω), there exists a payoﬀ function Π(x) such that
1. ￿1(x)=∇Π(x)
2. the uniform distribution on Ω is a steady state of the adaptation rule,
de￿ned by Γ1, Γ2,￿ 2 and ￿1.













￿2(y − x)dy (38)





2Γ(x)) − div[m(x)] (39)









is the Laplace operator.
The system (39)-(40) de￿nes Π(x) as a solution to the von-Neumann











is satis￿ed, the solution to this problem exists and is unique up to an additive






is a steady state of the stochastic adaptation rule de￿ned by Γ1, Γ2,￿ 2 and
￿1.
39The above result suggests that any adaptation rule can fail in some envi-
ronment. We might think of the adaptation rule as genetically transmitted
and changing only due to mutations and natural selection, where tastes (rep-
resented by Π(x) here) may vary signi￿cantly due to exogenous forces from
generation to generation. In this case, the previous result suggests that a
broad range of learning rules would be present in the population in the long
run. This would result in rather diverse social behaviors, and this diversity
should not be expected to go away with time.
7D I S C U S S I O N
Bounded rationality and learning models provide important insights which
allow one to understand better both some regularities observed in the lab-
oratory and real economic phenomena. Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998)
argued that a model of rent seeking based on boundedly rational behavior
describes reality better than the conventional model. Maskin and Tirole
(1999) and Tirole (1999) suggest that bounded rationality might prove to
be important in providing the foundations for incomplete contracts. For a
discussion of the interaction between bounded rationality, reciprocity, and
40the structure of the optimal contracts see Basov (2001).
8 APPENDIX
This Appendix is devoted to the proof of the existence result needed in




















TΓ2(x,y,t)(y − x)f(y,t)dy (47)
exists for any (x,t) ∈ Ω￿[0,τ] for any positive τ and any twice diﬀerentiable
initial condition f(x,0) = g(x).F o r t h e c h o i c e s e t Ω,d e n o t eb yC(Ω) the
Banach space of the functions continuous on Ω with the sup norm. De￿ne
the operator T : C(Ω) → C(Ω) in the following way. For any continuous
41density function f(x,t), use (47)-(48) to evaluate the matrix Γ(x,t) and
vector ￿(x,t), and plug them in (45)-(46). Let Tf be the solution of (45)-
(46) with the initial condition f(x,0) = g(x). The existence of a solution for
the problem (45)-(48) is then reduced to the existence of the ￿xed point of
the operator T. The proof of the existence of the ￿x e dp o i n ti sb a s e do nt h e
Schauder Fixed Point Theorem (see Stokey and Lucas 1993).
Note, ￿rst, that the set of continuous probability distribution functions
F is closed and convex. Let K be such that the maximum of the k￿1(x)k and
kΓ1(x,t)k on Ω￿[0,τ],a sw e l la sm a x i m u mo ft h ek￿2(x,y)kand kΓ2(x,y,t)kon
Ω￿Ω￿[0,τ],i sl e s st h e nK.D e ￿ne d =s u p ζ,z∈Ω kζ − ξk to be the diameter
of the set Ω. Since the set Ω is compact, d is ￿nite. Then there exist pos-
itive constants C1(K,d,τ) and C2(K,d) such that kTf(x)k ≤ C2(K,d) and
kTfj(x)k ≤ C1(K,d,τ) for all j.H e r eTf j(x) denotes the partial derivative
of Tf(x) with respect to xj. For a proof see Ladyzhenskaia, Solonnikov, and
Uralceva (1968). The ￿rst of these inequalities proves that the family T(F)
is uniformly bounded, while the second, together with the formula for ￿nite
diﬀerences, proves its equicontinuity.
It remains to prove that the operator T is continuous. Consider T to
be a composition of two operators: operator A that transforms a probability
42density function into the matrix valued function Γ(x,t) and the vector valued
function ￿(x,t) according to (47)-(48), and operator B that transforms them
into the solution (45)-(46) with the initial condition f(x,0) = g(x).( T h e
existence of f given ￿ and Γ was discussed in Section 3). Then T = BA.O p -
erator A is obviously continuous. The continuity of operator B follows from
the fact that solution of the initial-boundary problem for the diﬀusion equa-
tion depends continuously on its coeﬃcients (Ladyzhenskaia, Solonnikov, and
Uralceva 1968). Thus all the conditions of the Shauder Fixed Point Theorem
are satis￿ed and hence system (45)-(48) has a solution.
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